
safety-critical cyber-physical systems

A control engineering perspective

dr. ir. Sofie Haesaert

Assistant Professor TU Eindhoven

November 27, 2019



Control engineering — classically

Provide stability, performance and robustness via feedback withstanding physical uncertainty and stochasticity

Mechanical ~1788 Governor & throttle valve Ist automatic control

Analogue PID control

Digital control Optimal control Robust control Complex systems





FIG. 4.—Governor and Throttle-Valve.





Examples of digitally controlled systems



Models for digital control

state: x(t + 1) = F(x(t), u(t))output: y(t) = H(x(t), u(t))

+disturbances + sensor noise



Dynamical systems modeled via ordinary differential equation

state: $\dot{x}(t) = f(x(t), u(t))$ **output:** y(t) = h(x(t), u(t))


+disturbances

+ sensor noise

Control engineering — emerging

Technological innovations lead to increased functionality, complexity and autonomy

Waymo's fully autonomous driving







Complex merging of computation into the physical world

Increase of connectivity, functionality, complexity, and autonomy

Physical systems with software for communications, interactions, sensing, and control.





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Cyber-physical systems (CPS)

Delivery drones (amazon)

Credit: <u>dryve.com</u>

Autonomous driving



Credit: Amber

Smart grid

Credit: unsplash

Long-term autonomy



Credit: NASA/JPL-Caltech



systems

Complex merging of computation into the physical world

Increase of connectivity, functionality, complexity, and autonomy

Physical systems with software for communications, interactions, sensing, and control.



STOP: 0x0004c2 (inaccessible embedded device)

e computer will restart automatically

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Safety-critical cyber-physical

Software bugs directly affect physical world

Verify software + physical system

- Uncertain, continuous space models
- Noisy output measurements
- Stochastic disturbances

restart your computer, press Ctrl+Alt+Delete.




Dealing with stochasticity in CPS How to design and verify digital control?

High-level specifications e.g., Avoid A until K and eventually visit L ...


Physical model

- Wind & temperature
- Component failure
- Human behavior

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


Digital





bstraction



Physical domain




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
Digital


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Physical domain



Dealing with partial & noisy observations






S.Haesaert, P. Nilsson, et. al., ADHS conf. 2018







Dealing with partial & noisy observations How to design and verify digital control?




Computations on abstract model

- Value iterations
- Robust temporal logic satisfaction

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Control refinement to gMDP

- Preserves guarantees



Dealing with model uncertainty in CPS








How to verify functionality using data?

Partially unknown system



Use prior knowledge and data Solution: Compute confidence with Bayesian inference Data obtained from $\mathsf{P}\left\{\mathsf{M}(\theta) \vDash \psi \mid (u, y)_t\right\}$ system

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$$\rightarrow \qquad x_{t+1} = f(x_t, u_t; \theta) + v_t \\ y_t = h(x_t; \theta) + e_t \qquad M(\theta) \text{ Parametr} \\ \theta = \text{unknown parameter}$$

S. Haesaert et al. ACC15, CDC15, Automatica17





Dealing with model uncertainty in CPS How to collect the right data efficiently?

Design experiment input to gain information on property satisfaction.

$$\mathsf{P}\big(\mathsf{M}(\theta) \vDash \psi \mid \{u, y\}_t\big)$$

Data from experiment

= Optimal control problem Maximize probability of reaching decision


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Some data is expensive

S. Haesaert et al. ACC15, ECC16





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A control engineering perspective

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Thank you for your attention

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